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DEALING WITH INCOMPETENT COUNSEL-
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ROLE
William W Schwarzer*
Constitutional principles as well as our commitment to the ad-
versary system require competent performance by trial counsel. In
this Article, Judge Schwarzer argues that the traditional remedies
for ineffective performance - direct and collateral review of trial
lawyers' conduct or malpractice actions - do not adequately ensure
that attorneys competently represent their clients' interests. Rather,
direct action by the trial judge to assure the competence of trial
counsel is both desirable and necessary. Judge Schwarzer makes
specific suggestions to guide the trial judge's efforts to secure ade-
quate performance.
Responses to the problem of incompetent counsel are also con-
sidered in this issue in Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective
Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New Look After United
States v. Decoster. This Note focuses on judicial supervision of
defense counsel performance at the pretrial stage. The two pieces
may profitably be read together.
NADEQUATE performance of trial lawyers has become a
growing concern to the bench, the bar, and the public.I
This concern is reflected in a variety of ways. Courts review-
ing criminal convictions are examining the adequacy of the
defendant's representation more closely and under more exact-
ing standards. 2 Damage actions for lawyers' malpractice are
more common. 3 The organized bar is beginning to look at
incompetence as a possible ground for discipline. 4  Clinical
* United States District Judge for the Northern District of California. The assist-
ance of Jack Londen and Gail Ruetten Lopes, members of the California Bar, and
Noel M. Lawrence and Brian C. Johnson, is gratefully acknowledged.
' See, e.g., Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and
Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv.
227 (1973).
2 See p. 641 infra.
3 See, e.g., Schmidman & Salzler, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will New
Standards of Care Place Professional Liability Insurance Beyond the Reach of the
Specialist?, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 541 (1976); Comment, New Developments in Legal
Malpractice, 26 AM. L. REV. 408 (1977).
4 For example, until recently the California Supreme Court recognized only gross
negligence and willful inattention to a client's affairs as a ground for discipline or
disbarment. See, e.g., Ridley v. State Bar, 6 Cal. 3d 551, 493 P.2d 1o5, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 873 (1972) (en banc). But in 1975, the Court approved amendments to the
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programs to improve the quality of trial advocacy are receiving
increasing attention, both in the law schools and outside.5
And the Judicial Conference of the United States has approved
recommendations for the establishment of minimum standards
of competence for attorneys practicing in the federal courts.
6
While the dimensions of the problem are in dispute, surveys
indicate that judges rate the overall performance of around
one-tenth of the lawyers appearing before them as less than
adequate and prejudicial to their client's cause. 7 Whatever the
dimensions, the problem is to some extent inherent in the
conditions under which justice is administered. Because of the
pressures of staggering case loads and limited resources, the
criminal justice system frequently produces marginal perform-
ances by counsel. 8 Criminal defense work tends not to attract
Rules of Professional Conduct including a new rule 6-1iO requiring that legal services
be provided competently. Under this rule, an attorney who willfully or habitually
performs services lacking the learning and skill ordinarily possessed by lawyers in
good standing performing such services, or who fails to use reasonable diligence and
his best judgment, may be subject to discipline. The attorney's good faith is to be
considered in determining whether discipline is warranted. CAL. R. CT. 68o.
- See Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency,
1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 759, 881-92.
6 See FINAL REPORT OF THE COMM. TO CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION
TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES (i979). See also REPORT AND TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE COMM. TO CONSIDER STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1978) [hereinafter
cited as DEviTT COMM. REP.].
7 In a study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in 1977, questionnaires were
sent to all 476 federal district judges. In answer to the question, "Do you believe
that there is, overall, a serious problem of inadequate trial advocacy by lawyers with
cases in your court?," 41% of the 366 who responded answered "yes," 59% answered
"no." The judges rated the performance of 8.6% of the lawyers covered by the survey
as less than adequate. More than half said that the most frequent consequence of
inadequacy is that clients' interests are not fully protected. A. PARTRIDGE & G.
BERMANT, THE QUALITY OF ADvOCACY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 30-43 (1978).
A survey conducted by the American Bar Foundation in 1975 arrived at similar
conclusions. Based on responses from 1,422 state and federal judges throughout the
country, it found that 13% of individual trial performances were rated less than
minimally competent and that in about the same percentage of cases, the incompetence
of counsel had significantly prejudiced the rights of litigants. Maddi, Trial Advocacy
Competence: The Judicial Perspective, AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 105, 118
(1978).
This Article deals with "competence" in the sense of the effective and diligent use
of the lawyer's professional skills. It does not address manifestations of incompetence
arising from other causes, such as misconduct or breach of other professional obli-
gations, nor does it deal with the administering of sanctions, such as professional
discipline or contempt.
s For a bleak description of the operation of the system, see Bazelon, The Defective
Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. I, 1-17 (1973); Comment, Liberal Review
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the more competent lawyer and, because of economic consid-
erations, is often performed on an assembly line basis. 9 Eco-
nomics affect the quality of civil work as well. The cost of
litigation has risen beyond the means of most individuals and
of businesses of modest size, and lawyers often must choose
between pricing their services out of the market and being
inadequately prepared. It is also possible that because vast
numbers of new lawyers have been admitted to the bar in
recent years, more trial work is in the hands of relatively
inexperienced counsel. 10
The client who suffers the consequences of an inadequate
performance has some remedies. A criminal defendant may
appeal or seek post-conviction relief by writ of habeas cor-
pus. In addition, any client can sue his lawyer for damages
caused by malpractice. But, as we shall see, courts are reluc-
tant to reverse convictions on the ground of incompetence of
counsel, and malpractice damages are costly and difficult to
recover and may well be inadequate." The questions there-
fore arise whether trial judges can and should monitor the
performance of counsel and take action sua sponte when it is
necessary, 12 whether to do so would be consistent with the
of Defense Counsel's Performance: The Normal Competency Test, 1976 U. ILL. L.F.
407, 408-11 (1976).
9 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-36 (1972); id. at 57 n.21
(Powell, J., concurring); Bazelon, supra note 8.
1o Even with the implementation of proposals for improved trial advocacy training,
the judge's problem of how to deal with incompetent counsel is not likely to disap-
pear. See, e.g., DEviTT COMM. REP., supra note 6, supp. A at 14:
It seems appropriate to note, however, that even if fully effective remedies
are fashioned for the causes related to the competence and proficiency of
counsel, problems of substandard representation of litigants will remain and
may even grow, unless remedies are also fashioned for causes relating to high
costs of litigation and causes relating to effective judicial supervision of trials.
(Emphasis added).
II See pp. 642-49 infra.
12 Making judgments about attorney competence is not foreign to the trial judge.
He routinely acts on matters that involve questions of counsel's competence - the
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants, the imposition of sanctions for vio-
lations of rules and orders, the disqualification of counsel when there are conflicts of
interest, the certification of a class action, and the setting of fees. Typically, however,
the trial judge will act on the motion of a party, rather than sua sponte, and to
implement a specific mandate, such as an order, statute, or rule. Furthermore, these
motions usually do not involve direct challenges to a lawyer's competence. See p.
66o infra. The intervention contemplated here is novel, since it would generally be
sua sponte, and would be a direct response to perceived incompetence.
Authority for intervention of this kind derives from the judge's power to control
the proceedings before him. That power extends to the regulation of practice in his
court, including the admission of attorneys, supervision of their conduct, and impo-
sition of sanctions and discipline. See Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.zd 568, 571 (2d
Cir. 1975). Typical of rules reflecting this authority is rule iro-3 of the Local Rules
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adversary process and with relevant constitutional principles,
and how and under what circumstances a judge might act.
These questions have received little attention, most previous
discussion having focused on appellate and habeas corpus rem-
edies.
1 3
This Article addresses some of the questions raised by sua
sponte intervention. First, it argues that prophylactic action
by the trial judge is consistent with our commitment to the
adversary system and with relevant constitutional principles.
It also argues that those principles require the judge to take
steps to ensure that counsel is competent. Then, it rejects the
contention that the alternatives to intervention - direct and
collateral review, and malpractice actions - are adequate.
Finally, having concluded that the trial judge should monitor
lawyers' performances, it develops guidelines for intervention
in both criminal and civil litigation.
I. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ADVERSARY PROCESS
We are committed to the adversary process as the best,
even if imperfect, method of finding the truth and administer-
ing justice. 14 "Truth," Lord Eldon said, "is best discovered
by powerful statements on both sides of the question." 15 A
critical assumption underlying our commitment to this process
of the United States District Court, Northern District of California. The judge is
expected to act, unilaterally if necessary, to enforce the professional obligations of
attorneys. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 52z F.2d 1094, o99 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 423
U.S. 1038 (1975); In re Carroll, 416 F.2d 585, 587 (ioth Cir. 1969). Among these
obligations is the duty to adhere to the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics and the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 6 states, "Because of his vital role
in the legal process, a lawyer should act with competence and proper care in repre-
senting clients." Disciplinary Rule 6-ioi further defines this obligation:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(i) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not
competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent
to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circum-
stances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
13 See, e.g., Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: De-
partures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. REv. 927, 932, 943-45 (1973).
34 The adversary system is not without its critics, however. See, e.g., Frankel,
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. o3r, 1032 (1975)
(contending that the system "rates truth too low among the values that institutions of
justice are meant to serve"). Judge Frankel sees the judge's task to be "to promote
through the trial an objective search for the truth," id. at 1035, and objects "that our
system does not allow much room for effective or just intervention by the trial judge
in the adversary fight about the facts," id. at 1042.




is that it will be operated by competent lawyers. Lawyers
must be able to make the innumerable decisions which, al-
though often procedural, shape the litigation and direct it
toward its eventual outcome. 16 Criminal defense counsel must
decide or recommend whether to plead guilty, waive the right
to a jury, take the stand, object to evidence, and take an
appeal. Counsel in civil litigation must decide which claims
or defenses to assert, what forum to select, what discovery to
conduct, and what scope to give to the trial. Another as-
sumption underlying our commitment to the adversary system
is that each lawyer will present the strongest statement that
can fairly be made .for his side of the case. 17 The lawyer's
ability to marshal and present facts and law to support a
client's cause is critical to the process.1
8
As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent in Wainwright
v. Sykes, we "traditionally have resisted any realistic inquiry
into the competency of trial counsel," preferring instead "to
indulge the comfortable fiction that all lawyers are skilled or
even competent craftsmen in representing the fundamental
rights of their clients." 19 The facts refute this fiction. Putting
aside the cases of marginal performance or simple human
error, trial counsel at times perform with such manifest incom-
petence that litigants' rights are prejudiced. When that occurs,
the adversary process has effectively ceased to function. The
judge then faces the choice of taking over from counsel or
allowing the case to stumble toward a fortuitous result.
Intervention does present certain undeniable difficulties. It
requires the judge to depart from his traditional neutral rule.
Moreover, inquiry into counsel's litigation strategy could jeo-
pardize the confidential relationship between counsel and client
and impair the adversary process. 20 Indeed, the mere threat
16 See, e.g., Brown v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1977).
17 See ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS
RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS 5 (1976) ("The premise of the adversary system is that
each party has the incentive and ability to present all pertinent legal and factual
submissions supportive to his position and that the parties' combined efforts enable
the court to make a fully informed decision.") [hereinafter cited as TRIAL COURTS].
18 For if, as Chief Judge Kaufman writes, "lawyers fail as advocates for want of
skill or dedication, then judges surely will fail as well, and the coin of justice will be
debased beyond recognition." Kaufman, The Court Needs a Friend in Court, 6o
A.B.A.J. 175 (1974). See also United States v. Wright, 568 F.2d 142, 143 (9th Cir.
,978) ('It is the duty of counsel to assist the court, as well as the client .... ).
19 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 117-18 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 22 (D.C. Cir. July
10, 1979) (en banc):
[The court] must be wary lest its inquiry and standards undercut the sensitive
relationship between attorney and client and tear the fabric of the adversary
system.... For the law to encourage a wide-ranging inquiry, even after trial,
198ol
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of intervention may have a chilling effect on the freedom of
counsel to act in the manner which he thinks will best serve
his client, whether the court approves or not.21 But the in-
terest in preserving the adversary process militates more
strongly in favor of intervention than against it. We long ago
came to accept that process as more than a game and the
judge's role in it as more than that of a moderator charged
with seeing that the rules of the game are observed. 22 Inas-
much as the administration of justice is the judge's ultimate
responsibility, he cannot be indifferent to events which dimin-
ish the quality of justice in his court. 23 The propriety of sua
sponte intervention is unquestioned when counsel's conduct
disrupts the proceeding.24 Its propriety should be equally clear
when counsel is manifestly incompetent. For the effect of
incompetence on the administration of justice, even if less
dramatic, is likely to be just as destructive.
When incompetence is so serious as to lead to reversals on
appeal or to subsequent malpractice actions, the administration
of justice is destabilized. Reversals and damage awards stem-
ming from a lawyer's failure to perform adequately impair the
orderliness, predictability, and fairness of the judicial process
and undermine public confidence. Even where lawyers'
incompetence is not so serious as to justify reversal, the admin-
istration of justice suffers if one side is not adequately repre-
sented and inadvertent defaults occur.
The concern for lawyer competence, therefore, is not an
into the conduct of defense counsel would undercut the fundamental premises
of the trial process and transform its essential nature.
See also Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 792-93 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 85o (i958).
21 That the adversary system at times expects more of counsel than the trial judge
would like was recognized by the Seventh Circuit in In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389,
400 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Attorneys have a right to be persistent, vociferous, contentious,
and imposing, even to the point of appearing obnoxious, when acting in their client's
behalf. An attorney may with impunity take full advantage of the range of conduct
that our adversary system allows.").
22 See, e.g., Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (I933) ("In a trial by
jury in a federal court, the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the
trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of
law."). See also United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 833, 842-43 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
23 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § i.i(a) 167 (,974) ("The adversary nature of
the proceedings does not relieve the trial judge of the obligation of raising on his own
initiative, at all appropriate times and in an appropriate manner, matters which may
significantly promote a just determination of the trial.") [hereinafter cited as TRIAL
JUDGE]. See also id. at 163.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 6oo, 612 (976) (Burger, C.J.,




exercise in elitism. If the process by which justice is admin-
istered is to work as intended, lawyers must perform their
functions adequately. When it appears in the course of liti-
gation that a lawyer's performance is falling short, it should
be the trial judge's responsibility, as the person responsible for
the manner in which justice is administered in his court, to
take appropriate action. The question confronting the trial
judge, therefore, is not whether intervention can be reconciled
with the adversary process, but how to exercise the discretion
to intervene so as to accommodate the competing demands of
that process. 25
II. THE IMPACT AND INTERPLAY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
Our dedication to the due process of law matches the com-
mitment to the adversary system. A person with legitimate
grievances is entitled to a meaningful hearing, including ade-
quate notice and an opportunity to confront adverse witnesses
and present evidence and argument on his behalf. 26 The judge
cannot be indifferent to a lawyer's incompetence; when the
fairness of a trial is frustrated or jeopardized by manifest
incompetence of counsel, due process may be denied as surely
as if no hearing had been held.
27
Principles of due process, applicable to legal proceedings
generally, are enlarged and reinforced by the sixth amendment
governing criminal trials. The criminal defendant is entitled
to receive a speedy and public trial before a fairly chosen jury,
to be given notice of the charges against him, to confront the
witnesses against him, to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel. 28 These
25 See United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 22-23 (D.C. Cir. July
10, 1979) (en banc) ("Efforts to improve the performance of defense counsel should
not imperil that protection [provided by the adversary system for the rights of the
accused].").
26 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (i97o). More generally, the
trial must be fair. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 81g n.i5 (i975); Lutwak
v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 6Ig (1953).
27 See, e.g., White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932); cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970) (right to be heard
comprehends right to be heard by retained counsel).
28 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process




rights are absolute and the denial of any of them results in
automatic reversal.
29
The criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel
has evolved significantly in the last fifty years. Since Powell
v. Alabama,30 which held that the defendant is entitled to
"effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case,"' 31 the
Supreme Court has substantially enlarged the scope of that
right. As now interpreted, the right to counsel is binding on
state as well as federal courts, 32 extends to all cases in which
the defendant is ultimately imprisoned, 33 and is not surren-
dered in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.
34
Structural inhibitions on the effective assistance of counsel,
such as rules or orders restricting counsel from conferring with
the defendant during a recess between direct and cross-exam-
ination, 35 barring the defendant from giving testimony by way
of direct examination by his counsel, 36 or denying defense
counsel a closing argument in nonjury cases, 37 have been held
to be categorically prohibited regardless of whether they are
shown to be prejudicial. Late appointment of counsel38 or
29 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Cf. Chapman v. Califor-
nia, 386 U.S. x8, 23 n.8 (1967) (dictum) (some constitutional errors, but not including
denial of the right to counsel, may be deemed harmless, not requiring automatic
reversal).
30 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
31 Id. at 71. In a classic statement on the need for counsel, the Court said, in
part: "Even the intelligent and educated layman... lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he [has] a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him."
Id. at 69. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
32 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
33 See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (r979).
34 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
The Supreme Court has held that a defendant has the right to waive counsel
altogether, requiring only that his decision be made voluntarily and intelligently. See
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 832-35 (1975). See also United States v. Garafola,
428 F. Supp. 62o, 623-24 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd. sub nom. United States v. Dolan, 570
F.2d 1,77 (3d Cir. 2978). The recognition of this right, by acknowledging the de-
fendant's autonomy, is in tension with the premise underlying Powell v. Alabama and
its progeny that laymen are unable adequately to conduct their own defense. See,
e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). It does not, however, limit the trial
judge's responsibility or authority to ensure, that when the defendant is represented
by counsel, that representation be effective. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 772 (197o). See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 832-34,
838-4o (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
35 See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
36 See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596 (g6i). See also Brooks v. Ten-
nessee, 406 U.S. 6o5 (1972).
37 See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
38 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 7, (2932); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 55-60 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
640 [Vol. 93:633
TRIAL JUDGE'S ROLE
representation by counsel with conflicting interests39 may, de-
pending on the circumstances, deny the defendant effective
assistance. Finally, effective assistance may be denied where
representation by counsel is so lacking in diligence and com-
petence as to adversely affect the defendant's rights.
40
The frequency with which the issue of ineffective represen-
tation has arisen in recent cases before reviewing courts should
alert trial courts to the need to monitor counsel's perform-
ance. These cases clearly suggest that the trial courts have the
duty and the authority to protect the right to effective coun-
sel. That the trial judge should not hesitate to act to assure
the competent performance of counsel seems to be precisely
what the Supreme Court had in mind in McMann v. Richard-
son,4 1 when it said:
[W]e think the matter [whether counsel acted within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases], for
the most part, should be left to the good sense and discretion
of the trial courts with the admonition that if the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose,
defendants cannot be left to the mercies of the incompetent
counsel, and that judges should strive to maintain proper
standards of performance by attorneys who are representing
defendants in criminal cases in their courts.
42
39 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481-87 (1978); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 6o, 69-76 (1942).
40 Although the Supreme Court has not yet spoken authoritatively, a flood of
decisions on the issue has been loosed by federal courts of appeals in the last io
years. The traditional test, whether counsel's performance rendered the trial a "farce
and mockery of justice," has now been abandoned by all but three of the circuits.
The newly adopted standards differ in semantic detail from circuit to circuit but
generally appear to be derived from the opinion of the Court in McMann v. Rich-
ardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970), where it was stated that legal advice must be
"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." The most
recent and comprehensive review and analysis of the state of the law regarding
standards for appellate review of defense counsel's performance is found in the several
opinions accompanying the en banc decision in United States v. Decoster, No. 72-
1283 (D.C. Cir. July io, 1979), particularly Judge MacKinnon's concurring opinion.
See note 42 infra. See generally pp. 642-45 infra.
4' 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
42 Id. at 771 (emphasis added). See also United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy,
2o3 F.2d 407, 427 (3d Cir.) ("gross incompetence or faithlessness of counsel as should
be apparent to the trial judge . . . call[s] for action by him"), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
865 (i953); Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d Si, 816 (D.C.) ("the trial court
...has the duty to ensure that the assistance.. . rendered to an accused comports
with at least the minimum level of competence consistent with our standards of the
fair administration of justice"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. loo6 (1978); People v. Medina,
44 N.Y.2d 199, 207, 375 N.E.2d 768, 772, 404 N.Y.S.2d 588, 592 (1978) ("Trial
Judges have a continuing duty, not to be lightly eschewed, to see to it that the
proceedings are conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the
accused .... '). See also MacKenna v. Ellis, 28o F.2d 592, 6oo (5th Cir. ig6o),
198o]
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IlI. THE ADEQUACY OF THE ALTERNATIVES TO
INTERVENTION
Reservations about having trial judges openly monitor the
performance of counsel, and intervene when necessary, are
likely to persist. They are founded on the traditional concep-
tion of the judge's role, buttressed by the belief that criminal
defendants may be better protected against the shortcomings
of counsel by subsequent judicial review, since appellate
judges unaffected by the adversarial battle can evaluate coun-
sel's performance more objectively. 43 They are also supported
by an assumption that malpractice actions provide an adequate
relief to clients in both criminal and civil cases. It is therefore
appropriate to examine the adequacy of these alternatives to
intervention.
A. Appellate Review of Convictions
Although appellate review, founded on the reviewing
court's general supervisory power over the lower courts, is
broad in theory, it suffers from structural and doctrinal limi-
tations which reduce its effectiveness as a remedy for the
violation of the right to effective counsel. 44 The structural
limitations arise because an appellate court is bound by the
record of the trial court; it lacks the benefit of observing
counsel in action. As a result, most of the trial lawyer's prep-
modified, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (Ig6I); United
States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847, 854 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
A vigorous argument in support of trial judge intervention is made by Judge
Bazelon in his recent dissenting opinion (joined by Chief Judge Wright) in United
States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. July io, 1979), in which he states in part:
The real battle for equal justice, however, must be waged in the trenches
of the trial courts. Although reversing criminal convictions can have a signif-
icant deterrent effect, an appellate court necessarily depends upon the trial
courts to implement the standards it announces. No amount of rhetoric from
appellate courts can assure indigent defendants effective representation unless
trial judges - and ultimately defense counsel themselves - fulfill their re-
sponsibilities.
Slip op. at 38-41.
43 See, e.g., Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Standards and Remedies,
41 Mo. L. REV. 483, 499-500 (1976). See also Comment, Sanctions Imposed by
Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial Process, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6xg (1977).
44 Presumably federal appellate courts are on direct appeal able to pass on the
adequacy of counsel in the exercise of their supervisory authority, independently of
constitutional grounds. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947); McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943); United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip
op. at 20 (D.C. Cir. July io, 1979) (en banc); Bruce v. United States, 379 F.2d 113,
117 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The distinction between direct and collateral review, although
theoretically valid, appears, however, to have had no practical impact on the scope
of review of claims of ineffective representation. The courts seem generally to have
looked to the sixth amendment as the basis for review.
[Vol. 93:633
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aration and performance will be difficult to evaluate. The
lifeless and fragmentary appellate record 45 will provide few
insights into, and a poor perspective of counsel's knowledge of
the law, capacity to analyze and plan, and ability to conduct
effective direct and cross-examination of witnesses. This prob-
lem will be magnified to the extent that the lawyer was in-
competent. In such a case, the record is likely to be particu-
larly deficient.
Even assuming the appellate court has acquired an under-
standing of the proceedings below adequate to enable it to
pass on the issue of competence, it faces the doctrinal problem
of deciding what to do if it finds evidence of incompetence.
This problem has received attention in recent years as courts
have begun to adopt more stringent constitutional standards
for evaluating counsel competence. As long as the courts ad-
hered to the former standard, which required a finding that
the trial amounted to a "farce or mockery" before a conviction
would be reversed, 46 the cases in which remand for a new
trial was held justified were few but clearcut; a new trial was
granted only when the accused had in effect been deprived of
any trial at all. Since McMann v. Richardson,47 however, in
which the Supreme Court seemed to approve the adoption of
a minimum standard based on reasonable expectations of com-
petence, most appellate courts have abandoned the "farce and
mockery" rule for some type of reasonableness standard pat-
terned on the language of the McMann decision. 48 Giving
content to such a standard is an elusive and subjective task.
While some courts have sought to establish guidelines to
define what is minimally competent, most have recognized that
the determination must depend on the circumstances of each
case. 49 Even if a standard for adjudicating claims of counsel
45 See generally Bazelon, supra note 8, at 38-40.
46 See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889
(1945).
47 397 U.S. 759 (197o).
48 See note 40 supra.
49 See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, No. 72-1283, slip op. at 14-16 (D.C. Cir.
July 1o, 1979) (en banc); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1330 (gth Cir. 5978)
(en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (979). But see Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d
540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1oi1 (1978); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d
224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
The majority in Decoster argues that when appellate review is limited to cases of
"egregious" deficiencies of counsel, the law would "encourage a wide-ranging inquiry
. . . into the conduct of defense counsel [which] would undercut the fundamental
premises of the trial process and transform its essential nature . . . resulting [in]
upheaval in the role of the trial judge." United States v. Decoster, slip op. at 22.
Prophylactic action by the trial judge, as urged in this article, will serve to minimize
the need for the kind of disruptive action the Decoster court feared.
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incompetence could be defined, courts might be loath to re-
verse judgments on this ground, believing that such an action
would serve little useful purpose. Appellate decisions normally
establish guidelines for trial court conduct; reversals serve as
a deterrent against future departures from these guidelines by
the lower court. Since trial judges customarily are thought to
have little control over inadequate performance by counsel,
appellate courts might decide that reversal would fail to serve
that purpose.50
Probably the major limitation on the effectiveness of ap-
pellate review to vindicate a party's right to competent counsel
is the rule that, in the absence of "plain error," the appellate
court generally will not consider a ground raised for the first
time on appeal. 5 ' Thus, errors or omissions by trial counsel
- such as a failure to make an objection, to raise a defense,
or to request a jury instruction - are ordinarily barred as
grounds for appeal unless the error can be demonstrated to
have been so serious that prejudice to defendant resulted. In
this fashion the appellate courts attempt to resolve the dilemma
of incompetent counsel who, by creating the necessity for ap-
peal, creates at the same time the bar to review.
5 2
so See Bines, supra note 13, at 945. The author argues that appellate courts are
less inclined to reverse convictions for errors which trial courts cannot control, such
as lawyers' incompetence. While the author's analysis of appellate reasoning may be
valid, his assumption that trial courts cannot deal with incompetence is, of course, in
conflict with the thesis of this Article.
s' FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); see, e.g., McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754,
759 (5th Cir. 1967). See also United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 16o (1936)
("In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the
public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has
been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."), quoted in Silber v. United
States, 370 U.S. 717, 718 (1962). Although most frequently applied in federal criminal
appeals, the "plain error" rule may be invoked by the United States Supreme Court
in any case. SuP. CT. R. 40(I)(d)(2). Fundamental constitutional errors in state
criminal appeals have been noticed for the first time during argument before the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 673-74 nn.4-6 (i96i)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
Courts have been more reluctant to notice plain error when counsel below was
retained by the defendant than when counsel was appointed. Compare Borroto v.
United States, 338 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. x964), with United States v. Smith, 353 F.2d
I66 (4 th Cir. 1965). See also 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(CRIMINAL) § 856, at 375 (1969).
-"See, e.g., Wainwright €. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 104 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1 3 3 9 - 4 o(gth' Cir. 1978) (Hufstedler, J.,
concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1542 (I979). A survey of the cases
decided by the Kentucky appellate courts in one year involving evidentiary issues
disclosed some 28 types of procedural defaults, ranging from failure to object to
incompetent evidence to failure to file a transcript of the record on appeal, and
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Nevertheless, a different rule would reduce the administra-
tion of justice to chaos. Judgments after trial would be robbed
of finality if almost any tactical decision were subject to reex-
amination and any significant omission of counsel a ground for
a new trial. Counsel would have little incentive to employ
effective trial advocacy at the first trial since errors and de-
faults would provide the basis for a new trial. As a conse-
quence, the trial courts, deprived of effective advocacy, would
bear a greater burden and face increasing numbers of retri-
als. Finally, more defendants would go free because witnesses
would become unavailable and memories would fade by the
time the appeal is concluded.
B. Review in Collateral Proceedings
The impediments to review are even more formidable
where the defendant seeks collateral relief. A criminal defend-
ant can obtain such relief in federal court by petitioning for a
writ of habeas corpus. The writ is available only where the
petitioner is detained in violation of the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States. 53 Although denial of the effective
assistance of counsel provides a constitutional basis for review,
and although most circuits have abandoned the farce and
mockery standard for one based on what may reasonably be
expected, no court has held collateral relief to be available
simply upon a showing of ineffectiveness. Before granting a
new trial, they have required a further demonstration that
the ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice to the defendant or
that it was likely to have had an effect on the outcome.54
These obstacles combine with other obstacles to collateral
relief, which are based on respect for the functions performed
by the trial courts, recognition of the need for finality, and
concluded that frequently "a significant part of a criminal appeal is resolved on some
basis other than its merits." See Lawson, Presuming Lawyers Competent to Protect
Fundamental Rights: Is it an Affordable Fiction?, 66 Ky. L.J. 459, 464-66 (1978).
53 See generally Bines, supra note 13.
54 For a discussion of the various standards, see United States v. Decoster, No.
72-1283, slip op. at 4-39 (D.C. Cir. July io, 1979) (en banc) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring); id. at 4-39 (Robinson, J., concurring); id. at 5-8 (Bazelon, J., dissent-
ing). See also Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1331-34 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 1542 (1979); 586 F.2d at 1334-41 (Hufstedler, J., concurring and
dissenting).
It is likely that an adequate showing of prejudice will require proof of constitutional
error so substantial that it could not 6 e waived without the defendant's express
consent. Analytically at least, the incompetence issue would then be moot. See, e.g.,
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 92-94 (i977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (distin-
guishing between waiver of substantial constitutional rights and decisions made during
the trial). See also Bines, supra note 13, at 966-67.
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awareness of the perishable character of evidence. 55 For ex-
ample, failure to make a timely objection to a due process
violation will generally be treated as a waiver. 56 A failure to
comply with state procedural requirements, such as a rule
requiring that objections be made contemporaneously, will bar
relief in the absence of a showing of cause and resulting prej-
udice.57 A voluntary and intelligent guilty plea will cut off
preexisting defenses and objections.5 8
This gloss on the federal habeas remedy underlines the
crucial importance of competence of trial counsel. Although
the availability of competent legal assistance is a premise un-
derlying these rules,5 9 proving that the requisite degree of
competence did not exist is, for the reasons discussed, a dif-
ficult task. Aware that counsel must make numerous tactical
decisions in the course of the trial, courts will probably be
reluctant to grant relief so long as the decision complained of
is one which a competent attorney could have made, regardless
of whether in the particular case it was the product of incom-
petence and adversely affected the defendant's rights.
60
C. Legal Malpractice Actions
Thus, for a variety of reasons, appellate and collateral
review do not obviate the need for prophylactic action by the
trial court. Similarly, actions for damages based on legal mal-
practice are unlikely to provide effective relief to clients in
either criminal or civil litigation. Even if the client is knowl-
edgeable and sophisticated enough to recognize that his lawyer
has failed him and that a legal malpractice action is avail-
able, 61 and even if he has the initiative, endurance, and re-
ss See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88-91 (1977); Bines, supra note
13, at 935-45.
56 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 50, (1976).
57 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (I977). See also id. at 95-96 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (competence of counsel may be relevant to the determination of "cause"
and "prejudice").
5' See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (197o). But see Tollett v.
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (a defendant "may.. . attack the voluntary and
intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from
counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann').
s See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267-68 (X973); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
60 See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 96 (I977) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("The record persuades me that competent trial counsel could well have made a
deliberate decision not to object to the admission of the respondent's in-custody
statement.").
61 It is doubtful that many persons convicted of a crime are aware of the avail-
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sources to maintain such an action, the obstacles to success are
formidable. It is true that the elements of a legal malpractice
claim are no different than those for other professional mal-
practice actions.6 2 However, establishing these elements poses
a series of problems unique to legal malpractice suits.
To prove a breach of duty by his former lawyer, the client
must retry the underlying litigation. 63 This "suit within a suit"
brings with it many of the difficulties and diseconomies of
other kinds of after-the-fact scrutiny.64 Also, where the un-
derlying trial was a civil action, the boundary between com-
petence and incompetence is even more difficult to define than
in criminal cases. 65  Unlike criminal defense, there are no
generally accepted professional standards that prescribe the
course of civil litigation. 66 Every tactical and strategic decision
is a matter of the economics of the case and its peculiar
facts. As a result, published successful malpractice cases have
involved, almost without exception, instances of procedural
ability of malpractice actions against their former defenders, given "[t]he dearth of
criminal malpractice litigation." Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel
- Reflections on "Criminal Malpractice," 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (,974).
Until the recent case of Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718
(La. App.), writ denied, 356 So. 2d 1o1 (La. 1978), none of the handful of reported
malpractice actions arising out of criminal litigation had resulted in judgment for the
plaintiff clients. See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 731 (1973).
62 See, e.g., Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 95, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr.
849, 852 (1971):
The elements of a cause of action in tort for professional negligence are: (i) the
duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other
members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that
duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and the
resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's
negligence.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). Whether this standard.
makes sufficient allowance for the economic and time pressures under which lawyers
must conduct litigation is open to question.
63 See, e.g., Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (W.D. Tenn. .r976),
rev'd on other grounds, 593 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979); Campbell v. Magana, 184 Cal.
App. 2d 751, 754-55, 8 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33-34 (i96o). See also Coggin, Attorney
Negligence ... A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225 (1958).
64 See pp. 642-46 supra. It is true, of course, that the malpractice trial is not
confined solely to the record of the underlying litigation. For example, any available
witnesses may be called, and the successful malpractice plaintiff must not only estab-
lish that errors were made, but also project what the outcome and award would have
been if there had been no negligence. See pp. 648-49 & notes 69-72 infra.
65 On the difficulty of defining the boundary in criminal cases, see p. 643 supra.
66 See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUS-




default 67 or failure to do even the most cursory legal re-
search.68
Often the hardest problem is establishing that the client
was damaged by counsel's incompetence. In civil cases it is
well-settled that the client must prove that a more favorable
outcome would have resulted but for his attorney's incompe-
tence, proof that will often be speculative at best.69  The
outcome of any action is subject to so many uncertainties that
the causal role of counsel may defy proof. This problem be-
comes even more complex when the client's contributory neg-
67 The following procedural defaults are typical of those which supply valid causes
of action in malpractice suits: (I) falling to file suit before a statutory limitation period
ran, see, e.g., Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1978); (2) failure to
prosecute, see, e.g., Kessler v. Gray, 77 Cal. App. 3d 284, 143 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1978);
(3) failure to appear, see, e.g., Warwick, Paul & Warwick v. Dotter, 19o So. 2d 596
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); (4) failure to perfect an appeal, see, e.g., Welder v. Mercer,
247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970); (5) suing the wrong party, see, e.g., Sikora v.
Steinberg, 40 Misc. 2d 649, 243 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Sup. Ct. 1963); (6) failure to pursue
timely discovery, assert available defenses, and appear in court, see, e.g., Public Taxi
Serv., Inc. v. Barrett, 44 Ill. App. 3d 452, 357 N.E.2d 1232 (1976). See also Gates
& Zilly, Legal Malpractice, in AMERICAN BAR ASsoCIATION, PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY 311, 319-22 (1978); Leavitt, The Attorney as Defendant, 13 HASTINGS L.J.
1, 28-32 (196I); Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1295-96,
1298-3oi (1963); Note, Liability of an Attorney in the Conduct of Litigation, 12
SYRACUSE L. REV. 494 (ig6i).
68 See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621
(1975). In Smith, the California Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict against an
attorney who failed in a divorce action to assert his client's community property
interest in her husband's retirement benefits. Although such rights had not yet been
held by a court to be community property, the court concluded that the omission even
to assert the claim implied a failure to conduct "minimal research into either hornbook
or case law." Id. at 360, 530 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 628. See also Ramp v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 1971) (attorneys were held
liable for recommending a settlement, in a succession proceeding, for a small fraction
of the clients' claim when basic knowledge of estate law would have revealed that the
claim was entirely valid), modified on other grounds, 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239
(1972).
A Los Angeles Superior Court judge was recently reported to have upheld a
$400,000 jury verdict returned against a lawyer who had negligently failed to pursue
a product liability claim against the manufacturer of a defective punch press that cut
off its operator's right index finger. Instead the lawyer had obtained a workers'
compensation award of about $6,500. NAT'L L.J., Aug. 20, 1979, at 4, col. i.
69 See, e.g., Kilmer v. Carter, 274 Cal. App. 2d 8i, 78 Cal. Rptr. 8oo (x969);
Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5, 9--2I (1956). In Kilmer, judgment for the defendant attorney
was affirmed, despite his negligent failure to file an appellate brief, because the client,
having failed to produce evidence of the probable outcome of a retrial, had not proved
he would have prevailed on appeal. The court of appeals in the malpractice action
concluded that if the appeal had been prosecuted, at best a retrial on the issue of
damage would have resulted. See also Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. 1284, 1288
(W.D. Tenn. I976), rev'd on other grounds, 593 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979).
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ligence70 or failure to mitigate damages 71 are issues in the
malpractice action. And even when it is clear that the outcome
of a case would have been different if it were not for the
lawyer's incompetence, determining the dollar amount of dam-
ages is frequently very difficult.
7 2
Thus, a legal malpractice action is an inadequate remedy
for counsel's incompetence in a civil case. It is, moreover, a
patently insufficient remedy for counsel's incompetence in the
criminal context. Damages can hardly compensate a criminal
defendant for the taint of a conviction and incarceration.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR INTERVENTION
The trial judge therefore has a responsibility, grounded on
and tempered by the adversary process and constitutional prin-
ciples and reinforced by the absence of adequate alternatives,
to ensure a fair trial by maintaining minimum standards of
performance by counsel.7 3 But the judge must wield the cor-
relative power with caution lest its exercise defeat its purpose:
fairness in the administration of justice.
Assessment of an attorney's performance involves compar-
70 See, e.g., Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (ig6i);
Corceller v. Brooks, 347 So. 2d 274 (La. App.), cert. denied, 350 So. 2d 1223 (La.
'977).
71 See, e.g., Martin v. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3 d 414, 428, 97 Cal. Rptr. 730, 739
(197 1) (where the client failed to appear at his criminal sentencing hearing, and a plea
bargain was rejected by the trial judge, evidence of what the judge would have done
if the client had appeared should have been admitted'in the malpractice trial on the
issue of damages). See also Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 153, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 864, 867 (ig6i).
72 See, e.g., Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954). See
also Kilmer v. Carter, 274 Cal. App. 2d 81, 78 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969); Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 62 (I956); note 69 supra.
Complexities are inherent both in determining how much lighter a sentence would
have resulted but for the criminal defense lawyer's negligence, and in evaluating the
damages for any time unnecessarily served. See Geddie v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 718 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 356 So. 2d iouI (La. 1978).
Geddie affirmed a finding that the defendant criminal defense attorney's negligence in
failing to raise a double jeopardy defense resulted in eight months of illegal confine-
ment of the plaintiff. The trial judge's award of $7,000 per month, based on the
plaintiff's imprisonment at the state penitentiary, was reduced by the court of appeals
to $x,5oo per month because, but for the plaintiff's own misconduct, he would have
spent the time at a minimum security facility.
73 See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942) ("Upon the trial judge rests
the duty of seeing that the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of
the accused."); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932) ("It was the duty of the
court having [defendants'] cases in charge to see that they were denied no necessary
incident of a fair trial.'); notes 26-27 supra. See generally Comment, Incompetency
of Counsel, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 299 (,973).
198O]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
ison with other performances ranging over a broad spectrum
of skill, experience and diligence. It is influenced by the ob-
server's perspective and his knowledge of the facts and circum-
stances of the case. Without that knowledge, not usually fully
accessible to the trial judge, litigation strategy is difficult to
evaluate. Evaluation, moreover, must eschew the trial judge's
idealized conception of how he would have tried the case in
favor of what could reasonably be expected. 74 The trial
judge's discretion, consequently, must be guided by an aware-
ness that the assertion of judicial power can have serious
consequences for the independence of counsel, the integrity of
the attorney-client relationship, and the proper functioning of
the adversary process. Yet caution must not deter action
where judicial passivity would invite injustice. When there is
a need to exercise judicial power, the fear of abuse should not
be a ground for accepting the evils at which the power is
aimed.
In presiding over any trial, the judge seeks to achieve
fairness.75 Where the law affords him discretion in the appli-
cation of substantive or procedural rules, fairness normally
will guide its exercise. Since the competence of counsel is an
element of a fair trial, achieving fairness will require the mon-
itoring of counsel's performance and intervention in appropri-
ate circumstances. This does not require the judge to evaluate
the relative efficacy of trial tactics or to determine whether
counsel's performance should receive a passing grade. Nor is
the trial judge called upon to rule whether counsel's perform-
ance satisfies one of the minimum standards formulated by the
appellate courts or whether a party is being denied effective
representation. Instead, his function is to remedy observed
deficiencies before it is too late, resorting always to the least
intrusive measure adequate to the need.
Nevertheless, the decisions of appellate courts in cases of
alleged incompetence of counsel are relevant to the present
analysis. They illuminate the scope of defendants' rights and
the areas where incompetence of counsel, if left unremedied,
74 See the discussion at pp. 642-46 supra. See also Moore v. United States, 432
F.2d 730 (3 d Cir. 1970), where the court described some of these difficulties as follows:
The artistry of the advocate is difficult to judge retrospectively because the
elements influencing judgment usually cannot be captured on the record. The
kaleidoscopic range of possibilities often seems limitless, and it is proverbial
that the finest ideas emerge on the way back from the courthouse. The
advocate's work, therefore, is not readily capable of later audit like a book-
keeper's.
Id. at 736-37.
75 See note 73 supra.
[Vol. 93:633
TRIAL JUDGE'S ROLE
may lead to reversible error. The purpose of this discussion,
however, is not to help trial judges avoid reversals as much
as to serve as a guide to judicial monitoring and intervention
to the end that lawyer incompetence will not be permitted to
impair the fairness of the judicial process.
A. In the Criminal Process
z. Pretrial Phase. - The trial judge's concern with the
effectiveness of the assistance of counsel begins with the ap-
pointment of counsel. Defendants lacking the resources to
retain counsel are constitutionally entitled to appointed coun-
sel. 76 The appointment must be made sufficiently in advance
of trial to allow counsel a reasonable time for preparation or
the trial must be continued. 77  The judge should make an
independent judgment whether there is sufficient time to pre-
pare, for either counsel or the defendant may, for reasons of
their own, fail to request a continuance even where one is
needed.78  Finally the judge should consider objections to the
appointed counsel made by the defendant and satisfy himself
of the competence of the attorney being appointed.
79
Once counsel has appeared or has been appointed, the
judge must not tolerate procedural or structural impediments
to effective assistance. The defendant must be given adequate
opportunity to consult with counsel in private, and to have
counsel present at every "critical stage in a criminal proceed-
ing, ' ' 80 including the preliminary hearing, the arraignment,
and any lineup for identification.
8 1
76 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); notes 32-33 supra.
77 See MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 196o); cf. Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 54 (1970) (courts should make an effort to effect early appointment of
counsel, although late appointment does not require an evidentiary hearing on denial
of sixth amendment rights); id. at 55-60 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)
(hearing required on adequacy of representation by counsel entering case at last
minute). See also Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. .970) (where
defendant is represented by a defender organization, the relevant time is the appoint-
ment of the organization, not the assignment of a particular attorney).
78 See United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 51o F.2d 634 (7th Cir.) (de-
fendant failed to request continuance of trial; had he done so, under Illinois statute
he could have been subject to an additional four months of pretrial incarceration),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
79 See MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5 th Cir. i96o) (court appointed, over
defendant's objection, two newly admitted lawyers whose subsequent performance
turned out to be ineffective).
s" Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (5962).
81 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (197o) (preliminary hearing); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (pretrial identification lineup); Hamilton v. Alabama,
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If at any time during the proceeding the defendant makes
a seemingly substantial complaint about the adequacy of coun-
sel, whether appointed or retained, the judge should conduct
an inquiry and make findings on whether bona fide grounds
exist for a change of counsel. 82 A unilateral dismissal of coun-
sel by the defendant cannot be taken as a surrender of the
right to counsel; the court must conduct an inquiry to deter-
mine whether a waiver was intended. 83 A defendant's choice
to proceed without counsel confronts the court with the diffi-
cult problem of determining whether the waiver was knowing
and voluntary.8 4 Searching inquiry into the defendant's un-
derstanding of the direct and potential consequences of the
choice must be pursued.8 5  Even if the defendant's choice is
accepted, however, the court should appoint advisory counsel
to assist 'both defendant and the court. 86  Advisory counsel
368 U.S. 52 (ig6i) (arraignment); United States v. Smith, 4M1 F.2d 733 (6th Cir.
1969) (return of verdict and poll of jury). See generally Herring v. New York, 422
U.S. 853, 857 (I975); see also notes 35-37 supra.
82 See United States v. Woods, 487 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. '973); United States v.
Young, 482 F.2d 993 (Sth Cir. I973); United States v. Morissey, 461 F.2d 666 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 926 (i973); Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (gth Cir. 1970); People v. Marsden,
2 Cal. 3d 1i8, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970).
Although the defendant is more likely to express dissatisfaction with appointed
than with retained counsel, there is no persuasive reason for the judge to make
distinctions between the two in dealing with incompetence. See McQueen v. Swenson,
498 F.2d 207, 217 n.14 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1x69,
I192-93 (gth Cir. 2973); Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 820 (D.C.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. ioo6 (1978). Analytically, the distinction may be relevant to the
issue whether there has been a "denial" of effective assistance, see Comment, supra
note 73, at 3o8-i6, but not to the trial judge's concern with a fair trial, see note 73
supra.
83 See Sawicki v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1973).
84 Other potential problems that might flow from the recognition of a constitutional
right to self-representation are suggested in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6, 852 (i975).
8" See People v. Medina, 44 N.Y.2d 199, 207, 375 N.E.2d 768, 772 (2978). See
also TRIAL JUDGE, supra note 23, § 6.6, at i8o-8i:
A defendant should be permitted at his election to proceed in the trial of his
case without the assistance of counsel only after the trial judge makes thorough
inquiry and is satisfied that he (i) has been clearly advised of his right to the
assistance of counsel, including his right to the assignment of counsel when he
is so entitled; (ii) possesses the intelligence and capacity to appreciate the
consequences of this decision; and (iii) comprehends the nature of the charges
and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any additional
facts essential to a broad understanding of the case.
86 See TRIAL JUDGE, supra note 23, § 6.7; cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 8o6,
834 & n.46 (,975) (state may appoint advisory counsel to assist defendant if requested,
even over objection of the accused). The Court also observed that "the trial judge
may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious
and obstructionist misconduct." Id.
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might well be directed to consult with the defendant before
the court decides whether to permit him to proceed pro se.
Joint representation by counsel of two or more defendants
having actual or potential conflicting interests may deprive one
or more of them of effective assistance.8 7 Defendants may
waive the right to separate representation free of conflict, but
a waiver will neither be presumed nor found lightly.88 Al-
though courts have taken different views concerning the duty
of the trial court to act on its own initiative to deal with
apparent conflicts,8 9 it is clear the court must be alert to the
possibility of conflict. When a possible conflict is indicated,
the court must either conduct an inquiry, to the extent it can
do so consistent with counsel's duty of confidentiality to his
client, or simply appoint separate counsel. 90 When the judge
7 
See note 39 supra; DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 66, § 3.5.
88 See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (court will "indulge every
reasonable presumption against the waiver" of right to counsel); United States v.
Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 787-89 (2d Cir.) (waiver rejected where defendant found to
be frightened of trial and of new counsel), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976); United
States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975) (waiver of right to counsel free of
conflict of interest permissible where defendant's voluntariness and knowledge of
consequences are manifest on face of record).
89 In Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072, 1076 (5th Cir. i975), the court held
that "the trial judge has an obligation... to anticipate conflicts reasonably foreseeable
at the outset of the case, when counsel is appointed." Appointed counsel's joint
representation of the petitioner and two codefendants on a murder charge arising out
of the beating of a cellmate in a reformatory was held to have denied the petitioner
effective assistance of counsel because counsel was precluded from choosing to further
the petitioner's defense by establishing that another codefendant was the sole partic-
ipant in the homicide. See also MacKenna v. Ellis, 28o F.2d 592 (5 th Cir. 196o)
(appointed defense counsel who had pending applications for positions with the pros-
ecuting attorney's office did not satisfy sixth amendment requirement), modified, 289
F.2d 928 (Sth Cir. i96i); TRIAL JUDGE, supra note 23, § 3.4(b) (suggesting that the
judge should inquire into potential conflicts whenever two or more jointly charged
defendants are represented by the same attorney). Other courts have held that the
trial judge must inquire into possible conflicts only after indicia or suggestions of
conflict have appeared. See United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 102-03 (8th Cir.
,977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (,978).
90 See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484-86 (1978); United States v.
Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1978); Abraham v. United States, 549 F.2d
236 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Sheiner, 41o F.2d
337, 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859 (1969).
The difficulties inherent in determining whether the defendants have made an
informed and voluntary decision to accept joint representation are discussed in United
States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620 (D.N.J. 1977), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
Dolan, 57o F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978). The judge is hampered here by his lack of
knowledge of the case and by the restraints imposed by the fifth and sixth amendments
and rules of confidentiality. The defendants, moreover, will presumably have already
been advised by their counsel that no conflict exists. See also United States v. Partin,
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perceives the possibility of a conflict, he ought not to ignore
the problem simply on the strength of counsel's failure to raise
it, for the source of the conflict, joint representation, may be
the cause of counsel's silence. 91
2. Monitoring Trial Preparation. - Adequate preparation
lies at the heart of a competent trial performance. 92 It is far
preferable for the judge to monitor the adequacy of preparation
before the trial begins than to wait until trial when remedial
action becomes more difficult. 93 Unfortunately, there are no
general and objective standards by which to test the adequacy
of counsel's preparation; it turns on the circumstances of each
case, the information received by counsel from defendant, the
opportunities for making a defense, and the tactical choices
mandated by the client's interests.
A starting point may nevertheless be found in the American
Bar Association's Standards for the Defense Function, 94 spec-
ifying that to be adequately prepared counsel should
(i) Confer promptly with the client, discuss all aspects of
the case fully and seek to determine all relevant facts;95
(2) Advise the client promptly of any possible conflict of
interest;
96
(3) Inform the client promptly of his rights and all possible
defenses and take steps to vindicate those rights;
97
(4) Conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of
the case, including the information in the possession of the
prosecution; 98 and
6oi F.2d iooo (9th Cir. 1979); Willis v. United States, No. 78-2361 (9th Cir. Nov.
5, '979).
91 Indicia of potential conflict exist where one defendant might later decide to
testify and cross-examination on behalf of the other might become necessary, where
one defendant is charged with a substantive offense and conspiracy and a codefendant
with conspiracy only, where the degree of active participation in the offense appears
to differ between defendants, where by reason of age differences or family relationship
one defendant may be in a dominant position over the other, where the circumstances
suggest the availability of a defense to one defendant but not the other, or where
counsel is paid by only one of the defendants. See United States v. Marshall, 488
F.2d 1169, 1190-94 (9th Cir. 1973).
92 The responses of 1,422 judges to the American Bar Foundation's survey indi-
cated that the dominant factor determining competence was preparation, followed by
experience and training, presentation, and personal conduct and appearance. See
Maddi, supra note 7, at 124.
93 See Monroe v. United States, 389 A.2d 811, 8i8-ig (D.C.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. ioo6 (1978); pp. 66o-6i infra.
94 THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 66.
9s See THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 66, § 3.2(a).
96 See id. § 3.5(a).
9 7 See id. § 3.6(a).
98 See id. § 4.1.
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(5) Advise the client fairly and fully concerning all aspects
of the case. 99
Reference to these standards alone, of course, will not assure
the court that what counsel has done was adequate, correct
and fair. But they do provide a checklist for use at appropriate
points in the pretrial process when symptoms of incompetence,
such as lack of preparation, indicate the need for inquiry.
An effective vehicle for pretrial monitoring of counsel's
competence is the pretrial conference.' 0 0 Even if brief, such
a conference will compel counsel to focus attention on the trial,
inform them of their obligations, and disclose evident deficien-
cies. An agenda would include items such as the following:
(i) Defining what, under the statute charged, are the precise
legal and factual issues to be tried and what subsidiary
issues are in dispute, such as identification, ownership,
chain of custody or the chemical composition of relevant
substances;
(2) Summarizing the prosecution's testimonial and docu-
mentary evidence, including what witnesses will be called
and what documents and other materials offered;
(3) Reporting on the status of discovery, including the pro-
duction of exculpatory materials and other information in
the prosecution's possession to which the defense may be
entitled;
(4) Exploring any potential evidentiary problems, including
possible grounds for the suppression or exclusion of certain
evidence, application of the confrontation clause, and lim-
itations on the use of prior convictions; and
(5) Considering possible defenses, such as alibi and entrap-
ment (including the availability of supporting witnesses),
and available pretrial motions (such as for severance of
defendants or counts).
Participation in a conference based on such an agenda will
almost certainly make defense counsel conscious of any gaps
in his preparation. The judge in turn will be able to get a
sense of the extent of counsel's preparation, familiarity with
99 See id. § 5..
100 See generally ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL §§ 1.4, 5.3, 5.4 (I974);
TRIAL JUDGE, supra note 23, § 3.6.
The court should also consider the pleadings and courtroom performance of counsel
in connection with motions and other pretrial appearances to monitor the adequacy
of his knowledge of relevant law and procedural rules and mastery of the facts of the
case, as well as his capacity to argue in a cogent manner.
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criminal trial procedure, and general competence to handle the
defense. Serious deficiencies are likely to be disclosed at such
a conference, affording the trial judge an opportunity to take
preventive action.
Pretrial monitoring will enable the judge to measure the
adequacy of counsel's preparation for trial against minimal
standards of preparedness. For example, counsel cannot ren-
der effective assistance without having made an adequate in-
vestigation. 10 1 While he has no duty to manufacture a false
defense, 10 2 or to undertake a dragnet search simply in the
hope of turning up helpful evidence, 10 3 he must at least inter-
view eyewitnesses and pursue other evident leads that may
provide support for clearly indicated defenses. Only after such
an investigation can he advise his client properly and make
the required tactical decisions. If counsel's performance at the
pretrial conference suggests a serious lack of preparation, the
judge might well make discreet inquiries, short of asking the
defense to disclose its case, whether, for example, eyewitnesses
or alibi witnesses have been interviewed and are likely to be
called and about what plans exist to produce other witnesses
or exhibits to support particular defense theories. 1
0 4
One aspect of counsel's preparation is obtaining exculpatory
and other helpful information in the prosecution's possession
to which the defendant may by law be entitled. Under Brady
v. Maryland,0 5 the government has a duty to turn over to the
defendant without request only material which is "highly pro-
bative of innocence,"' 1 6 that is, evidence the withholding of
which would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The pros-
ecution may, however, have other materials of potential, if
lesser, help to the defendant which it must turn over only if
101 See McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974); 560 F.2d 959 (8th
Cir. 1977) (where murder defendant claimed self-defense, defense counsel held inef-
fective, having failed to interview any of prosecution's 41 listed and 26 called wit-
nesses, to obtain weapon allegedly used by the deceased assailant, and to seek infor-
mation from other sources). See also Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968)
(in rape prosecution, defense counsel held ineffective, having failed to interview any
of the known eyewitnesses and to inform defendant of the elements of the charged
offense); Brubaker v. Dickson, 31o F.2d 30 (gth Cir. 1962) (failure to contact obvious
witnesses and assert obvious defenses).
102 See Matthews v. United States, 518 F.2d 1245 (7 th Cir. x975).
103 See Jackson v. Cox, 435 F.2d 1089 (4th Cir. 1970).
104 Requiring counsel to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation does not mean
that it must be personally performed by the attorney. The Criminal Justice Act, x8
U.S.C. § 3 oo6A(e) (1976), for example, authorizes the payment of reasonable amounts,
on counsel's application, for investigator's services.
105 373 U.S. 83 (2963).
106 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 220 (1976).
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requested to do so.' 0 7 . A failure to make appropriate requests
may be another danger signal.
Along with investigating the facts, counsel preparing for
trial must review the defenses and objections available to the
defendant and consider whether and how they are to be
raised. The fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments afford a de-
fendant a spectrum of rights ranging from those not subject to
waiver to those that are lost if not asserted at the first oppor-
tunity. The judge during the pretrial phase must be alert to
the protection of these rights by counsel and to the possible
need for judicial intervention.
Certain rights may not be waived. For example, due proc-
ess categorically precludes the trial of any legally incompetent
defendant. Regardless of whether counsel raises the issue,
therefore, the judge must conduct a hearing whenever circum-
stances create a bona fide doubt as to defendant's compe-
tence.108 Other rights and objections, however, are generally
subject to loss by waiver. Certain of those rights, such as the
rights to a trial on the charges, to a jury, and to the assistance
of counsel, are considered to be so substantial that they can
be surrendered only by a knowing and voluntary waiver by
the defendant. The judge has a duty to conduct a hearing to
satisfy himself, regardless of the representations of counsel,
that the waiver is the product of the defendant's decision,
reached on the basis of competent legal advice.' 0 9
The largest category of rights consists of "trial-type" rights
which, although regarded as substantial, are subject to waiver
by the act or omission of counsel." 0 Their assertion turns on
tactical decisions "in which the expertise of counsel [is] signif-
icant and the defendant's feelings on the matter
insignificant." 11' Their loss through counsel's action or inac-
tion, is, in the absence of "plain error," not reviewable."
2 If
107 See id. (where murder defendant claimed self-defense, it was not error for
prosecution not to produce victim's arrest record without request).
108 See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. i62, i81 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S.
375, 385 (1966); de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 54o F.2d 975, 979-83 (9th Cir. 1976) (en
banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 (I977).
109 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (i939); TRIAL JUDGE, supra note 23,
§§ 3, 4, 4.3, 6.6 ("a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent advice
is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that counsel may have
misjudged the admissibility of the defendant's confession"). See also Tollett v. Hen-
derson, 411 U.S. 258 (I973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
110 See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 514 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 92-94 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, supra note 66, § 5.2.
"I United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 452 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1971).
112 See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976) (failure to object to unconsti-
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these kinds of rights are not to be forfeited through incompe-
tence of counsel, the trial judge must be prepared to inter-
vene. 1
13
Perhaps the most common situation implicating the last
category of rights involves the use of evidence which may be
subject to suppression because illegally obtained. The judge
must begin with the assumption that defense counsel, if com-
petent and prepared, is in the best position to make the tactical
decision whether to make the motion. Even when good
grounds exist, counsel's judgment may lead him to waive an
objection where, for example, he considers the evidence to be
on balance more exculpatory than incriminatory. 114  Never-
theless, courts have recognized "alerting circumstances" which
obligate the trial judge to investigate the need for a suppression
hearing. Such circumstances may exist where there is a serious
doubt about the voluntariness of a confession, as, for example,
where the defendant displays an abnormal mental or physical
condition or obvious ignorance or lack of awareness.115
Similar alerting circumstances should lead the judge to
question counsel when a significant default appears imminent,
such as a failure to challenge obvious racial bias in the makeup
of a grand or petit jury, 116 or to attack a prejudicial misjoinder
of counts or defendants which could result in the admission of
otherwise inadmissible evidence or keep a defendant off the
witness stand under circumstances likely to result in preju-
dice. 117
tutional grand jury selection); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (failure to
object to defendant's appearance at trial in prison clothes); Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. 233 (I973) (failure to object to unconstitutional jury selection); note 51 supra.
113 See note 52 supra.
114 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 96-97 (977) (Stevens, J., concurring);
United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 833, 842 & n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
I1s See United States v. Powe, 591 F.2d 833, 842-44 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (unpre-
paredness of counsel on issue of admissibility of confession and evidence of direct or
implied promises of leniency raised doubt as to voluntariness of confession); United
States v. Taylor, 374 F.2d 753, 756 (7th Cir. x967) ("a defendant's apparent abnormal
mental or physical condition, obvious ignorance, or lack of awareness" may raise
doubt as to voluntariness of confession); cf. LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 35
(ist Cir.) (indications of threats or duress by police require hearing on voluntariness),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. io8o (i974); Grieco v. United States, 435 F.zd 677, 678 (7th
Cir. 1970) (special circumstances may justify sua sponte hearing on voluntariness),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (97i); Jacobson v. California, 431 F.2d 1017, 1o9 (9th
Cir. 1970) (absent objection or evidence of involuntariness, no need for a special
hearing).
116 See Lee v. Hopper, 499 F.2d 456, 464-65 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1053 (974).
17 See United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 452 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1971); TRIAL
JUDGE, supra note 23, § 3.9 (suggesting the judge order severance sua sponte where
appropriate).
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3. Pretrial Intervention. - A range of options is available
to the court at the pretrial stage should it decide intervention
is necessary. When inquiry discloses that counsel appears to
be lacking in diligence or skill, but the shortcomings appear
to be remediable, the court should consider giving appropriate
suggestions, advice or directions to prevent a default, prefer-
ably on the record and in the presence of opposing counsel.
In case of a serious deficiency, the judge may well admonish
or rebuke counsel. 118 But where counsel's inadequacy appears
to be so serious that it creates a risk of ineffective represen-
tation, the court should advise the client of that fact and of
the right to change counsel. If the client declines the advice,
the court may require the association of qualified trial counsel
or himself appoint advisory counsel to assist the defense." 9
Even where the defendant does not consent, the court may,
where gross incompetence has been demonstrated, bar counsel
and appoint substitute counsel or require defendant to proceed
with different retained counsel. The defendant's right to "ob-
tain private counsel of his own choice . . .must be weighed
and balanced against an equally desirable public need for the
efficient and effective administration of criminal justice."'
120
Accordingly, courts have appointed substitute counsel or re-
quired a defendant unwilling to retain or accept appointed
substitute counsel to proceed pro se where counsel had to be
barred for disruptive behavior, had been continuously un-
available, or had a conflict of interest.' 2' In the recent case
11s The American Bar Foundation survey found that more than 96% of the judges
responding had at some time dealt with incompetence by giving "instruction or advice"
in chambers, 77% had "rebuked" counsel in chambers, and a majority had given
"instruction or advice" in open court. Maddi, supra note 7, at 129.
119 Cf. United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 203-04 (2d Cir.) (appointed attorney
believed by court to be more effective than retained counsel participated in defense
with court's permission), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977).
120 United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970) (defendant's delay in obtaining own counsel).
121 See United States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102 (gth Cir. 1978) (substi-
tution ordered of counsel for one of two defendants because common counsel had
conflict); United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83 (ist Cir.) (after a prior continuance
when defendant's counsel was unavailable, and after giving defendant time to retain
other counsel, court appointed counsel), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977); United
States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 124 (5 th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (court barred one of plaintiff's
co-counsel from courtroom after repeated misconduct), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104
(1977). See also United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (illness of
counsel of choice among factors which should have caused severance of defendant's
trial); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir.) (right to counsel not
absolute and waivable if attorney not selected in reasonable time), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1o63 (1972).
If it becomes necessary to suggest or order the removal of an attorney, the judge
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of United States v. Rogers ,122 the district court, after declaring
a mistrial, granted the government's motion to disqualify de-
fense counsel on the ground of incompetence. Similarly, where
counsel is not a member of the bar of the court, leave to
appear pro hac vice may be denied or withdrawn for failure
to meet minimum standards of competence or conditioned on
association of qualified local counsel.
123
should keep in mind the court's disciplinary authority over attorney's fees. Cases
involving conflicts of interest support the discretion of trial courts to alter fee agree-
ments and even to order the return of fees to the client in the interest of fairness.
Coffelt v. Shell, 577 F.2d 30 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Fountain, 74 Cal. App. 3d 715,
141 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1977). Exercise of that discretion may also be appropriate where,
because of counsel's incompetence, a fee agreement is unfair or where prepayment of
fees could otherwise preclude the client from discharging an incompetent lawyer.
122 471 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). On motion of the government, and over
defendant's objection, the court disqualified an 83-year-old retained lawyer, stating:
Davidson's representation of his client in these proceedings falls far short
of the level of competency required of criminal defense counsel. We note again
his failure to pursue needed discovery; his failure timely to move for a bill of
particulars, severance and change of venue; his lack of preparation for witness
examination; his inability to hear the proceedings, with its consequent disrup-
tive effect on the clear presentation of evidence; and his failure to abide by
rulings of the court and inability generally to conduct himself before the jury
in a manner consistent with his obligation to his client, thereby subverting the
integrity of the factfinding process.
Id. at 855-56 (footnotes omitted). See also Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d ixoi,
iio5 (D.C. 1978) ("Gross incompetence . . . of counsel . . . may justify the court's
removal of an attorney, even over the defendant's objection.").
123 See TRIAL JUDGE, supra note 23, § 3.5. Membership in the bar of a federal
court is a constitutionally protected right which cannot be withdrawn without a
hearing. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (,957); Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S.
46 (1916). The court must therefore meet the minimal requirements of procedural due
process - notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and the statement of a
rational basis for the decision - before excluding a member of its bar, even if it is
only from participation in a particular case.
The right of a lawyer not admitted to the bar of the court to appear pro hac vice
is created and defined by the law of the forum. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442
(1979) (per curiam). Whether the right to appear pro hac vice can be denied or
withdrawn without procedural due process depends therefore on whether the forum
court's law creates a legitimate claim of entitlement "derived from statute or legal rule
or through a mutually explicit understanding." Id. Ohio law, involved in the Flynt
case, gave out of state lawyers no protected property right to appear pro hac vice;
thus, no procedural protections needed to precede the denial of an application to
appear. Id. at 443-44. The different rights that exist elsewhere, whether created by
rule of court, e.g., in the Southern District of New York as interpreted by Spanos v.
Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 16i, z68 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
987 (i966); but see Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. at 442 n.4, or by judicial decision, see,
e.g., In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1975), may create claims of entitle-
ment subject to procedural protections similar to those appropriate in a case where
the attorney in question is a member of the bar of the court. But these procedural
requirements can readily be satisfied where a lawyer has demonstrated incompetence
sufficiently egregious to merit denial or withdrawal of permission to appear. Cf. In
re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1977) (attorney admitted pro hac vice subject to
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4. Monitoring the Trial. - Monitoring performance be-
comes more difficult once the trial begins and tactical decisions
dominate the proceeding. The adequacy of counsel's perform-
ance must then be judged, not on the basis of isolated acts or
omissions, but by its overall impact. As the trial develops,
cumulative failures to participate effectively in the jury selec-
tion process' 24 and in the examination or cross-examination of
critical witnesses 1 2 5 may sooner or later warrant intervention,
particularly when indicia of incompetence have appeared in
pretrial proceedings. Similarly, the personal conduct of coun-
sel may impinge on the effectiveness of the representation and
call for intervention; the judge should be alert for evidence of
inattention, 12 6 apparent physical or emotional weaknesses of
counsel, 127 and bizarre courtroom behavior. 128  Judicial toler-
ance or indulgence of such conduct may not be a virtue.
At the same time the judge must take care not to use his
local ethical standards and court supervision); Sanders v. Russell, 4oi F.2d 241 (5th
Cir. 1968) (recognition of interest in maintaining high quality of representation).
124 See Marzullo v. Maryland, 56I F.2d 540 (4 th Cir. 1977) (failure to object to
reference to prior indictment in presence of prospective jury panel, to pursue effec-
tively question of possible jury bias, and to request cautionary instruction), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1Ol1 (1978).
125 See United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 484-86 (D.C. Cir. 974) (Ba-
zelon, J., dissenting) (failure to cross-examine effectively chief prosecution witness
whose testimony was unreliable and perhaps incredible); Moore v. United States, 432
F.2d 730, 738-39 (3d Cir. I970) (en banc) (failure to cross-examine critical identifi-
cation witness on previous inability to identify defendant, coupled with failure to
investigate prior attempt to identify defendant at lineup and call eyewitnesses allegedly
unable to identify defendant).
126 See United States v. Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597, 602-04 (D.C. Cir. i970)
(failure to appear at arraignment, conduct jury voir dire, make opening statement,
cross-examine two of four government witnesses, request jury instructions, or make
more than a perfunctory closing argument established mechanical nature of defense
sufficient to prove absence of effective assistance). But see United States v. Katz,
425 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970) (no reversal even though defense counsel heard to
express unhappiness over having the case and was twice seen sleeping during witness
examination).
127 Cf. Butler v. United States, 26o F.2d 574 (4 th Cir. 1958) (per curiam) (retained
counsel under indictment for drug offense and under treatment for addiction is cause
for concern); Hudspeth v. McDonald, 12o F.2d 962, 966-68 (ioth Cir.) (defense
counsel alleged to have drunk excessively during trial), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 617
(194I).
128 See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. i974) (defense counsel,
among other things, called obviously hostile FBI agent for no apparent purpose,
waived jury although judge who would try case had received damaging inadmissible
information about defendant, failed to request fingerprint report though judge bad
ordered government to pay for it, and failed to call res gestae witnesses unable to
identify defendant).
Such behavior, as well as misconduct in general which may result from incom-




power so as to impede the effective performance of counsel.
In managing the proceeding in court, he must not permit
procedural rules or practices to hamper counsel unduly. 129 He
must respect the confidentiality of counsel's communications
with his client and of his work product. He needs to recognize
that a lawyer's approach to a case is individualistic, that tac-
tical judgments will vary, and that a novel strategy may be
sound, particularly where the case against the defendant ap-
pears overwhelming.
130
Having all of these cautions in mind, the judge nevertheless
ought continuously to be conscious of threats to the fairness of
the trial. His trial experience and legal knowledge should
enable him to spot a problematical performance. Beyond that,
he should not ignore his intuition, tutored by his observation
of many lawyers, about the soundness of the performance of
the lawyer before him. 131
5. Intervention at Trial. - As the trial progresses, the
opportunity for prophylactic action decreases while the impact
of intervention may become more drastic. Judicial interven-
tion must therefore be timely to prevent cumulative damage
by incompetence, yet must be undertaken with caution in view
of its likely effect on counsel's conduct of the trial and its
impact on the jury. But, when intervention is necessary the
range of options is generally similar to that available before
trial. 1
32
When counsel's conduct of the trial raises a question in the
judge's mind concerning competence, he should raise that
question with counsel at a sidebar conference or, if the matter
is sufficiently serious, in chambers. He must do so promptly
if damage is to be avoided. On the other hand, the judge
obviously should not make it a practice to query lawyers about
their conduct of the case; there must be alerting circumstances
to justify the action.
129 See p. 640 supra.
130 See United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 202 n.17 (2d Cir.) (quoting Judge
Friendly in United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 197o)), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 872 (1977).
131 Although the emphasis here has been on incompetence of defense counsel, the
court ought to monitor the performance of counsel for the prosecution as well, prin-
cipally in the course of the trial. Manifestly ineffective or overzealous performance
by the prosecution not only damages the public interest in the effective enforcement
of the criminal laws, but may well result in reversible error where, for example,
inadmissible evidence is brought before the jury or improper argument is presented,
The suggested means for intervention are equally available to deal with prosecutorial
incompetence.
132 See pp. 659-6o supra. For some examples of judicial intervention, see Bazelon,
supra note 8, at 16.
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In the first instance, the judge's questions can be entirely
innocuous and nonintrusive: Does counsel have further voir
dire, wish to exercise any peremptory challenges, or object to
questionable evidence being offered? Where an adverse wit-
ness appears to have had a strong impact, the court might
well point out the fact and ask whether counsel is prepared to
cross-examine, and whether pretrial investigation has disclosed
a factual basis for cross-examination. Where conduct by the
government might have had a prejudicial impact on the jury,
inaction by defense counsel might lead the judge to ask counsel
what he proposes be done about it. If counsel appears to be
unprepared in the course of cross-examining adverse witnesses
or examining his own, the court might call a recess, instruct
and admonish counsel, and allow additional time for prepa-
ration. The court should also alert counsel to a possible de-
fault, 133 such as the excusing of a witness who might be needed
later, a failure to submit jury instructions, or a failure to make
a timely motion or objection necessary to protect the record.
The court, however, is not to take over for defense coun-
sel. The court cannot be expected to make evidentiary objec-
tions for the defense; but if counsel persists in failing to make
valid objections, or is about to waive a critical objection such
as one arising under the confrontation clause, the court should
inquire whether it is counsel's intention to do so. Nor can the
court be expected to take over the questioning of witnesses.
While it has been said that the judge may have a duty to elicit
those facts necessary to the clear presentation of the issues,
which may in extraordinary cases include calling and exam-
ining witnesses and adducing evidence, his primary duty is to
remain, as well as to appear, impartial; ordinarily he should
refrain from extensive or pointed questioning of witnesses. 
134
Recourse to more drastic measures may sometimes be re-
quired. Suggesting or directing a change of counsel in the
course of a trial is a step the court should take only when
demonstrably necessary. The rights both of counsel and of the
defendant must be carefully weighed against the demands of
a fair trial.
135
If, in the judge's view, the jury has become, as a result of
133 See p. 657 supra.
134 United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1952) (extensive questioning by
the trial judge coupled with injudicious remarks constituted reversible error); see
United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 438, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975); United States v. Wyatt, 442 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(extensive questioning by trial judge which opened new areas of inquiry and gave
undue eminence to others constituted error).
13s See pp. 659-6o supra.
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counsel's incompetence, so biased that a fair trial is no longer
possible, it is appropriate to declare a mistrial. 136 If granted
at the request or with the consent of the defendant, it will not,
in the absence of prosecutorial or judicial misconduct, bar a
retrial. 1
37
In the absence of consent, the judge must find a "high
degree of necessity," warranting the subordination of the de-
fendant's right to have the "trial concluded before the first jury
impaneled" to the "public's interest in fair trials designed to
end in just judgments." 138  In such a case, the court should
make findings supporting the conclusion that the prejudice to
the defendant's cause from counsel's incompetence was so sub-
stantial, and the alternative available so inadequate, that a
mistrial must be granted. 139
Finally, the judge has the option of ordering a new trial
after a guilty verdict. Here the trial judge, however, acts in
a capacity similar to that of an appellate court and is bound
by the applicable standard of review for ineffective assistance.
6. Post-trial. - The right to effective assistance does not
end with the trial. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
contemplate an active role for counsel in matters subsequent
to trial. Rule 29 permits the court to enter judgment of ac-
quittal either on motion of defendant or on its own motion.
Rule 33 requires that a motion for a new trial be made within
seven days after a verdict or within such further time as may
be fixed during the seven day period. 140 To prevent a default,
therefore, the court may appropriately inquire whether counsel
desires to present any post-trial motions.
The defendant is entitled to have counsel at sentencing to
present any grounds that will aid the court in reaching a
favorable disposition.' 4 1 To ensure effective performance, the
136 See generally United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 6oo (1976).
137 Id. The Supreme Court has specifically rejected the notion that such consent
must conform to the "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" standard of Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 n.xx (1976)
(trial court had declared mistrial with defendant's informal consent, after ejecting
defendant's lead counsel for making a prejudicial opening statement in spite of court's
prior warnings).
138 Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516 (1978).
139 See United States v. Williams, 411 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also
United States v. Rogers, 471 F. Supp. 847 (E.D.N.Y. r979).
140 If the ground for new trial is newly discovered evidence, rule 33 allows the
motion within two years of final judgment.
141 United States v. Pinkney, 55i F.2d 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Gadsden v. United
States, 223 F.2d 627 (D.C. Cir. r955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 949 (1956); see DEFENSE
FUNCTION, supra note 66, § 8.x, at 134-35:
(b) Defense counsel should present to the court any ground which will assist
in reaching a proper disposition favorable to the accused. If a presentence
report or summary is made available to the defense lawyer, he should seek to
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judge may inquire whether counsel has examined and takes
exception to any part of the presentence report and has any
additional facts or arguments that the court should consider in
imposing sentence. The court should also protect the defend-
ant against loss of the right to appeal by inadvertence or
neglect. 142 Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
now requires the court to advise the defendant of his rights to
appeal and to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis after
imposition of sentence following trial on a not guilty plea.
7. Feasibility. - Is it realistic to expect a judge, heavily
burdened with a growing backlog of criminal cases, to indulge
in the apparent luxury of pretrial conferences, sua sponte in-
quiries into the adequacy of counsel's preparation, and consid-
eration of objections, defenses and posttrial motions? Even if
these proposals are feasible in courts having light dockets, how
could they be applied in large metropolitan courts where crim-
inal cases are dispatched on an assembly line basis? Final
answers to these questions must await experience. But this
judge, at least, has found that thorough pretrial proceedings
increase lawyer preparation, reduce trial time, and promote
negotiated dispositions. Moreover, as lawyers become cogni-
zant of the trial judge's willingness to intervene to assure
effective representation, their performance should improve,
thus reducing the number of instances in which intervention
by the judge is necessary. Finally, the prophylactic approach
suggested here should reduce the number of appellate reversals
and new trials. In any event, the constitutional mandates for
effective representation and fair trial procedures are facts, as
is occasional incompetence of trial counsel. Courts must deal
with the resulting problems, and to the extent the trial court
is able to provide preventive relief, the interests of justice as
well as economy and efficiency will be served.
B. In the Civil Process
i. Pretrial Phase. - Manifest incompetence in civil pro-
ceedings is no less a violation of counsel's professional obli-
gations than in criminal cases, even if the constitutional im-
verify the information contained in it and should be prepared to supplement
or challenge it if necessary....
(c) Counsel should alert the accused to his right of allocution, if any, and to
the possible dangers of making a judicial confession in the course of allocution
which might tend to prejudice his appeal.
142 Cf. Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 332 (1969) (defendant entitled
to habeas relief where trial court had refused to permit him to make an oral motion
to appeal in forma pauperis after imposition of judgment, resulting in failure to file
timely notice of appeal, the Court saying: "At the very least, the trial judge should




plications are more tenuous. The absence of a constitutional
right to effective representation 143 and the economic consid-
erations which govern civil litigation make it more difficult to
define the appropriate role for the trial judge with respect to
incompetence. Nevertheless, if the adversary process is to
operate fairly, it is incumbent upon the judge to monitor coun-
sel's performance and intervene where egregious deficiencies
143 The right to be represented by counsel in civil cases was well-established in
English common law long before our Bill of Rights was enacted. See 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *355- Indeed, the explicit mention of only criminal trials in
the sixth amendment reflects the intention to reject the English rule forbidding counsel
in felony criminal cases, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 6i-65 (1932), rather
than an intention to deny such a right in civil cases, see Comment, Leis v. Flynt:
Retaining a Nonresident Attorney for Litigation, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 572, 581 n.65
(I979). Commentators have argued that the due process clause of the 14th amendment
implies even a constitutional right to appointed counsel for indigents in civil cases
involving property. E.g., Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM.
L. R.v. 2322 (1966); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE
L.J. 545 (2967); cf. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (dictum) (if due process
were to require counsel in criminal cases, it would also mandate representation in
civil cases involving property). But cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(overruling Betts on ground that counsel in criminal case is a "fundamental right').
No case has been found supporting a 14 th amendment right to appointed counsel in
civil cases.
Statutory provisions authorize judges to appoint counsel for a complainant
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 2964, 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(f)(i)
(1976), and to request an attorney to represent a person prosecuting or defending any
action in forma pauperis, 28 id. § 1915(d). But no authority exists for the payment
of fees to appointed counsel in civil cases except as provided specifically by statute.
Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973);
United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636 (9 th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978
(1966). Fees may be assessed as a part of a judgment in favor of a prevailing party
in a suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooa-3(b) (2976), or a suit to enforce a person's
constitutional rights, id. §§ i98i-i986, 1988. In addition, under general common law
principles, the court may direct the payment of fees out of a fund created or preserved
by reason of the attorney's efforts. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970). See generally Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients:
Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1597 (2974). Finally, in rare cases,
the court may direct payment of fees by a losing party who has acted "in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex
rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 126, 229 (1974); accord, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59 (2975). Whether, in view of the absence
of funds to compensate him, an attorney may refuse the appointment is perhaps a
question of theoretical more than practical interest. Some courts have found a duty
so to serve to be among the traditional obligations of members of the bar. Tyler v.
Lark, 472 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 864 (2973); United States v.
Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 2965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (2966). Others have
concluded that the 13 th amendment deprives the court of the power to require lawyers
to serve involuntarily, either under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976), see United States v.
Leser, 233 F. Supp. 535, 537-38 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd on other grounds, 335 F.2d 832
(9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 983 (1965), or under 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5(f) (1)
(1976), see In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII
Proceedings, 475 F. Supp. 87, 91--92 (N.D. Ala. 1979).
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appear. The obligation of the judge to do so is accepted
without question in those cases where parties are legally in-
competent - most commonly cases involving minors or absent
parties - and the judge is expected to make an independent
judgment concerning their interests. 144 Similarly, in class ac-
tions the judge is obligated to determine the adequacy of the
representation of class members. 145 It is, of course, not desir-
able for the judge to take on a similar obligation in civil
litigation generally. That he sometimes bears the obligation to
consider whether the interests of parties are adequately rep-
resented shows, however, that it is within his capacity to
monitor the performance of counsel for manifest incompetence
and take remedial steps when necessary.
Lawyers who have tried cases before a judge demonstrably
partial to one side may rebel at the thought of judicial inter-
vention, whether to criticize a lawyer or to help him. They
may well feel that intervention - even if undertaken solely in
the abstract interest of furthering the adversary process -
jeopardizes the appearance of impartiality. These are valid
concerns that the trial judge must keep in mind. There is no
reason, however, why the court, without sacrificing the ap-
pearance of impartiality, may not take steps to assure that
counsel will be adequately prepared for trial, and, in the course
of doing so, inquire about claims and defenses suggested by
the facts before it; explore with counsel efficient and productive
methods of discovery; clarify and define the issues; review the
adequacy and admissibility of the testimonial and documentary
proof proposed to be offered by each side; and generally over-
see the progress of the litigation and keep counsel engaged so
as to minimize the risks of defaults due to neglect. Especially
in cases where the conduct of one or more attorneys creates
doubt about their competence, the court should employ meth-
ods for ensuring that they are thoroughly prepared for trial.
These include requiring the submission of pretrial memoranda
on the issues to be tried, jury voir dire questions, detailed jury
instructions, lists of witnesses with a summary of the testimony
of each, lists of exhibits, proposed trial objections, and, in
'44See, e.g., Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1978); Blakely v.
Johnson, 37 IIl. App. 3 d 112, 345 N.E.2d 814 (1976); Wasson v. Wasson, 92 N.M.
162, 584 P.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1978). But see United States v. Weinstein, 5ii F.2d
622, 628 (2d Cir.) (analogy to judge's role with respect to incompetents not sufficient
to justify active participation in evidence production), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975).
14- FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(I). See also Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 75-76
(sth Cir. 1973); Cullen v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546,
56o, 563-64 (E.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 566 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1977).
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nonjury cases, narrative statements of the proposed direct tes-
timony of the principal witnesses.
146
The options for intervention in civil cases are similar to
those described for the criminal process.147 The judge should
not hesitate to inquire into counsel's trial strategy where the
proposed witnesses and exhibits either fail to address the issues
the judge sees in the case or where counsel's approach to the
case seems to be deficient. As in criminal cases, these inquiries
are better conducted before the trial begins than later.
1 48
While a court-induced change of counsel will be rare, a judge
ought to feel free to inform an attorney of any serious grounds
to question his capacity to serve as trial counsel, perhaps
suggesting the desirability of associating competent trial
counsel.
2. The Trial Phase. - The judge's approach to monitoring
performance and intervention during a civil jury trial will be
similar to what has been described in connection with criminal
trials.149 While the warning signals will also be similar, they
will be more difficult to interpret because of the greater range
of legitimate trial tactics in civil cases. Moreover, the judge
will be both freer and more restrained than in criminal pro-
ceedings; freer because the risk of judicial error is less in a
civil trial, and more restrained because incompetence may be
more difficult to determine in a civil case.' 5 0 In bench trials,
of course, the issue is far less critical inasmuch as there is no
restraint on the court's participation in questioning witnesses
and counsel to produce a record which it considers adequate
for decision.
For the most part, what is suggested here is not a revolu-
tionary departure from the practice of many judges who take
an active part in the management of the litigation before
146 See, e.g., Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 78-3745 (9th Cir. Nov. 7,
1979); N.D. CAL. R. 235-5 to -1o. See generally, Schwarzer, Managing Civil Liti-
gation - The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUD. 400 (1978); Schwarzer, Beating the Trial
Court Paper Chase, LITIGATION, Spring 1979, at 5.
147 See pp. 659-6o supra.
148 See p. 66i supra.
149 See pp. 661-64 supra.
ISO Also militating in favor of more liberal intervention is the reluctance of appel-
late courts to apply the "plain error" rule civil cases to review errors not preserved
by objection at trial unless shown to be "fundamental" or "obvious." See generally
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 421 n.i9 (1977) (exceptional circumstances permit
review); Piper V. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 48 n.34 (1977) (matters of
importance reviewable); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 & n.9 (1976).
Inasmuch as the rule has not been codified or incorporated in rules of procedure, in
courts other than the Supreme Court, it has only the standing of a common law
principle. See, e.g, United States v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 55o F.2d 494 (9th
Cir. 1977). See also notes 51, 112 supra.
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them. Nevertheless, difficult questions may arise when the
apparent incompetence of one side seems to confer a substan-
tive advantage on the other. What, for example, should the
judge do when one side presents an apparently meritorious
motion for summary judgment but fails to file the necessary
affidavit to support a critical factual assertion? Only if the
judge accepts the adversary process as an end in itself would
he be satisfied to dispose of a contested matter substantially
affecting a party's rights knowing that the outcome most likely
is the result of one side's lack of attention or skill. It would
seem preferable for the judge to do what he feels necessary to
satisfy himself that both sides of the case have been adequately
presented.
V. CONCLUSION
The judge's role in the adversary process does not include
playing back-up counsel for any party. Nor does it require,
however, indifference to the fairness with which the process
operates. The judge has an inescapable responsibility for the
maintenance of professional standards in the courtroom to
ensure a fair trial. The discharge of that responsibility need
not impair the adversary process; on the contrary, it should
strengthen it. Promoting the vigorous and effective represen-
tation of both sides in the contest will help rather than hurt
the process of finding the truth and achieving a just decision.
The judge, therefore should, in the words of Judge Charles
E. Wyzanski, Jr., "[administer] his office true to its traditional
limitations as well as to its aspirations."' 151 He should con-
sciously include among his judicial concerns the performance
of counsel appearing before him. He should be sensitive to
signals of inadequacy or default and respond in appropriate
fashion if it appears that the result may be affected by the
incompetence of counsel. That should be true even given
crowded dockets and heavy case loads. If, in the short run,
concern with incompetence of counsel were to impose some
additional burdens on the trial courts, the long-term benefits
from higher standards of lawyer performance should more than
offset them.
1"I Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REV.
1281, 1281 (1952).
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